In this respect we can tell those who assert the truth and certainty of the reality of sense-objects that they should go back to the most elementary schools of wisdom, viz. the ancient Eleusinian Mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus, and that they have still to learn the secret meaning of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine. For he who is initiated into these mysteries not only comes to doubt the being of sensuous things, but to despair of it; in part he brings about the nothingness of such things himself in his dealings with them, and in part he sees them reduce themselves to nothingness. Even the animals are not shut out from this wisdom but, on the contrary, show themselves to be most profoundly initiated into it; for they do not just stand idly in front of sensuous things as if these possessed intrinsic being, but, despairing of their reality, and completely assured of their nothingness, they fall to without ceremony and eat them up. And all Nature, like the animals, celebrates these open Mysteries which teach the truth about sensuous things.

G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit

東洋哲学も結局「哲学」である。これもまた、対関係としての他者を排除するところに成立している。どこでも、内省-すなわち自己対話=弁証法-から出発する思考は、その結論がイデアであろうと空であろうと、独我論(モノロ-グ)であるほかない。いうまでもないが、東洋のブッダも孔子も、そのような独我論をイロニカルに拒否することによって、あるいは主客身分の純粋経験といった神秘主義をイロニカルに拒否することによって、ひとを《他者》に向かい合わせようとした。単純にいえば、彼らは「他者を愛せ」といったのだ。真理を愛することは、結局、それを可能にしている共同体(コミュニティ)を愛することである。ところが、《他者》は、そのようなコミュニティに属さない者、言語ゲームを共有しない者のことである。そのような他者との対関係だけが、彼らの関心事であった。
 しかも、彼らはソクラテスやイエスと同様に書かなかった。書かないということは、音声的なコミュニケーションの直接性を優位におくからではない。書くことは、われわれを一般的他者との関係に、「事象の根拠」を問う弁証法に向かわせてしまう。だが、彼らは、そのような弁証法=哲学体系を拒否するために、他者との一対一関係の対話のみ始終したのである。
 むろん、ブッダにせよ、孔子にせよ、彼らのいうことは、まもなく「共同体」に回収されてしまった。そして、それは彼ら以前からある「神秘主義」に吸収されたのである。神秘主義は、私と他者、私と神の合一性である。それは《他者》を排除している。いいかえれば、“他者性”としての他者との関係、“他者性”としての神との関係を排除している。そこにどんな根源的な知があろうと、私と一般者しかいないような世界、あるいは独我論的世界は、他者との対関係を排除して心理(実在)を強制する共同体の権力に転化する。西田幾多朗やハイデッガーがファシズムに加担することになったのは、偶然(事故)ではない。

柄谷行人、『探求 I』

In the strict sense, the unsold and discarded commodity is defrauded, too. Whether or not the commodity is valuable is determined only after the salto mortale of the exchange. The commodity that is not sold is entrapped in the form of “wanting in despair to be oneself” or in “sickness unto death” from Kierkegaard. Commodity may be seen as a synthesis of use-value and exchange-value only inasmuch as seen from the ex post facto stance, while such a synthesis does not exist ex ante facto. The value of a commodity can come into existence only after it is exchanged with another commodity, an equivalent.

Kojin Karatani, Transcritique: On Kant and Marx

「意味している」ことが、そのような《他者》にとって成立するとき、まさにそのかぎりにおいてのみ、“文脈”があり、また“言語ゲーム”が成立する。なぜいかにして「意味している」ことが成立するかは、ついにわからない。だが、成立したあとでは、なぜいかにしてかを説明することができる―規則、コード、差異体系などによって。いいかえれば、哲学であれ、言語学であれ、経済学であれ、それらが出立するのは、この「暗闇の中での跳躍」(クリプキ)または「命がけの飛躍」(マルクス)のあとにすぎない。規則はあとから見出されるのだ。
 この跳躍はそのつど盲目的であって、そこにこそ“神秘”がある。われわれが社会的、実践的とよぶものは、いいかえれば、この無根拠的な危うさにかかわっている。そして、われわれが《他者》とよぶものは、コミュニケーション・交換におけるこの危うさを露出させるような他者でなければならない。

柄谷行人、『探求Ⅰ』

In a close reading of Marx’s analysis of the commodity-form, Karatani ground the insurmountable persistence of the parallax gap in the “salto mortale” that a product has to accomplish in order to assert itself as a commodity:

The price /of iron expressed in gold/, while on the one hand indicating the amount of labour-time contained in the iron, namely its value, at the same time signifies the pious wish to convert the iron into gold, that is to give the labour-time contained in the iron the form of universal social labour-time. If this transformation fails to take place, then the ton of iron ceases to be not only a commodity but also a product; since it is a commodity only because it is not a use-value for its owner, that is to say his labour is only really labour if it is useful labour for others, and it is useful for him only if it is abstract general labour. It is therefore the task of the iron or of its owner to find that location in the world of commodities where iron attracts gold. But if the sale actually takes place, as we assume in this analysis of simple circulation, then this difficulty, the salto mortale of the commodity, is surmounted. As a result of this alienation — that is its transfer from the person for whom it is a non-use-value to the person for whom it is a use-value - the ton of iron proves to be in fact a use-value and its price is simultaneously realised, and merely imaginary gold is converted into real gold.
This is Karatani’s key Kantian/anti-Hegelian point: the jump by means of which a commodity is sold and thus effectively constituted as commodity is not the result of an immanent self-development of (the concept of) Value, but a “salto mortale” comparable to a Kierkegaardian leap of faith, a temporary fragile “synthesis” between use-value and exchange-value comparable to the Kantian synthesis between sensitivity and understanding: in both cases, the two irreducibly external levels are brought together. For this precise reason, Marx abandoned his original project (discernible in the Grundrisse manuscripts) of “deducing” in a Hegelian way the split between exchange-value and use-value from the very concept of Value: in Capital, the split of these two dimensions, the “dual character of a merchandise,” is the starting point. The synthesis has to rely on an irreducibly external element, as in Kant where being is not a predicate (i.e., cannot be reduced to a conceptual predicate of an entity), or as in Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, in which the reference of a name to an object cannot be grounded in the content of this name, in the properties it designates.


The problem with teaching Nietzsche to American students … there are two opposites: in one sense it doesn’t mean a thing to them and they won’t pay attention to it; in another, certain kinds of students will go wild about it in a quite dangerous way … Nietzsche’s rhetoric—and of course this is one of the problematic aspects of Nietzsche—is such as to make anybody feel significant, ya know, and hate the world around them … easy sense of transcendence and significance and such. One of the things that was very striking as a teacher in the 60s when many students had mental breakdowns, it was a very regular aspect of life … and the number of students for whom Nietzsche was the material … practically every student who would come into my office having some kind of paranoid or schizophrenic episode would be citing Nietzsche in one way or another.

Allan Bloom (via crematedadolescent)

fuckyournoguchicoffeetable:

Fuck your wall manifesto.

———————————
As Badiou demonstrated apropos the Stalinist show trials, this violent effort to distill the pure Real from the elusive reality necessarily ends up in its opposite, in the obsession with pure appearance: in the Stalinist universe, the passion of the Real (ruthless enforcement of the Socialist development) thus culminates in ritualistic stagings of a theatrical spectacle in the truth of which no one believes. The key to this reversal resides in the ultimate impossibility to draw a clear distinction between deceptive reality and some firm positive kernel of the Real: every positive bit of reality is a priori suspicious, since (as we know from Lacan) the Real Thing is ultimately another name for the Void. The pursuit of the Real thus equals total annihilation, a (self)destructive fury within which the only way to trace the distinction between the semblance and the Real is, precisely, to STAGE it in a fake spectacle.
— Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real

fuckyournoguchicoffeetable:

Fuck your wall manifesto.

———————————

As Badiou demonstrated apropos the Stalinist show trials, this violent effort to distill the pure Real from the elusive reality necessarily ends up in its opposite, in the obsession with pure appearance: in the Stalinist universe, the passion of the Real (ruthless enforcement of the Socialist development) thus culminates in ritualistic stagings of a theatrical spectacle in the truth of which no one believes. The key to this reversal resides in the ultimate impossibility to draw a clear distinction between deceptive reality and some firm positive kernel of the Real: every positive bit of reality is a priori suspicious, since (as we know from Lacan) the Real Thing is ultimately another name for the Void. The pursuit of the Real thus equals total annihilation, a (self)destructive fury within which the only way to trace the distinction between the semblance and the Real is, precisely, to STAGE it in a fake spectacle.
— Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real

ウィトゲンシュタインは、「言語ゲーム」によって、われわれのコミュニケーションがなんらかの規則(コード)によっていることをいいたいのではなく、その逆に、そのような規則とは、われわれが理解したとたんに見出される、“結果”でしかないといいたいのである。そのような規則は、ある記号で何かを「意味している」ことが成立するそのかぎりで、たちまち「でっち上げられる」。そして、このような規則の変改を規制するような規則はありえないと、ウィトゲンシュタインはいう。
 こうして、「言語ゲーム」という概念は、一つの懐疑によってつらぬかれている。それは、どこまでも、内的な同一的な意味(規則)の想定を疑いつづけるのだ。「意味している」ことが成立するか否かにすべてがかかっている。が、それを根拠付ける何ものもない。たとえば、「生活様式」が共通しているがゆえに、言葉が「意味している」ことが成立するのではなく、その逆である。この結果と原因をとりちがえてはならない。

柄谷行人、『探求 I』

While homelessness is rampant worldwide, the production of empty spaces is a regular feature of contemporary society. When buildings sit empty for a long time while homelessness persists, it is clear that in these cases markets and states fail to fulfill their expected role as effective allocators of space.

Miguel Martínez, Gianni Piazza and Hans Pruijt - 'Introduction'

to ‘Squatting in Europe: Radical Spaces, Urban Stuggles’ by Squatting Europe Kollective

(via sociology-of-space)

The great success which attends reason in its mathematical employment quite naturally gives rise to the expectation that it, or at any rate its method, will have the same success in other fields as in that of quantity. For this method has the advantage of being able to realize all its concepts in intuitions, which it can provide a priori, and by which it becomes, so to speak, master of nature; whereas pure philosophy is all at sea when it seeks through a priori discursive concepts to obtain insight in regard to the natural world, being unable to intuit a priori (and thereby to confirm) their reality. Nor does there seem to be, on the part of the experts in mathematics, any lack of self-confidence as to this procedure — or on the part of the vulgar of great expectations from their skill — should they apply themselves to carry out their project. For, since they have hardly ever attempted to philosophize in regard to their mathematics (a hard task! ), the specific difference between the two employments of reason has never so much as occurred to them. Current, empirical rules, which they borrow from ordinary consciousness, they treat as being axiomatic. In the question as to the source of the concepts of space and time they are not in the least interested, although it is precisely with these concepts (as the only original quanta) that they are themselves occupied. Similarly, they think it unnecessary to investigate the origin of the pure concepts of understanding and in so doing to determine the extent of their validity; they care only to make use of them. In all this they are entirely in the right, provided only they do not overstep the proper limits, that is, the limits of the natural world. But, unconsciously, they pass from the field of sensibility to the precarious ground of pure and even transcendental concepts, a ground (instabilis tellus, innabilis unda) that permits them neither to stand nor to swim, and where their hasty tracks are soon obliterated. In mathematics, on the other hand, their passage gives rise to a broad highway, which the latest posterity may still tread with confidence.
— Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
The great success which attends reason in its mathematical employment quite naturally gives rise to the expectation that it, or at any rate its method, will have the same success in other fields as in that of quantity. For this method has the advantage of being able to realize all its concepts in intuitions, which it can provide a priori, and by which it becomes, so to speak, master of nature; whereas pure philosophy is all at sea when it seeks through a priori discursive concepts to obtain insight in regard to the natural world, being unable to intuit a priori (and thereby to confirm) their reality. Nor does there seem to be, on the part of the experts in mathematics, any lack of self-confidence as to this procedure — or on the part of the vulgar of great expectations from their skill — should they apply themselves to carry out their project. For, since they have hardly ever attempted to philosophize in regard to their mathematics (a hard task! ), the specific difference between the two employments of reason has never so much as occurred to them. Current, empirical rules, which they borrow from ordinary consciousness, they treat as being axiomatic. In the question as to the source of the concepts of space and time they are not in the least interested, although it is precisely with these concepts (as the only original quanta) that they are themselves occupied. Similarly, they think it unnecessary to investigate the origin of the pure concepts of understanding and in so doing to determine the extent of their validity; they care only to make use of them. In all this they are entirely in the right, provided only they do not overstep the proper limits, that is, the limits of the natural world. But, unconsciously, they pass from the field of sensibility to the precarious ground of pure and even transcendental concepts, a ground (instabilis tellus, innabilis unda) that permits them neither to stand nor to swim, and where their hasty tracks are soon obliterated. In mathematics, on the other hand, their passage gives rise to a broad highway, which the latest posterity may still tread with confidence.
— Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

We have found, indeed, that although we had contemplated building a tower which should reach to the heavens, the supply of materials suffices only for a dwelling-house, just sufficiently commodious for our business on the level of experience, and just sufficiently high to allow of our overlooking it. The bold undertaking that we had designed is thus bound to fail through lack of material—not to mention the babel of tongues, which inevitably gives rise to disputes among the workers in regard to the plan to be followed, and which must end by scattering them over all the world, leaving each to erect a separate building himself, according to his own design.

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

At present, however, we are concerned not so much with the materials as with the plan; and inasmuch as we have been warned not to venture at random upon a blind project which may be altogether beyond our capacities, and yet cannot well abstain from building a secure home for ourselves, we must plan our building in conformity with the material which is given to us, and which is also at the same time appropriate to our needs.